Untitled Document

CAB Crash

Their post crash analysis is that these high altitude flights aren't necessary if you just govern the engine and fake high altitude on ANY base, OR between 5 and 8,000 feet, which they do at the HAATS training site at the Eagle County airport.

After consulting with Forest Service personnel concerning the accident investigation about the Army helicopter crash last summer it is clear that:
- The Forest Service believes the use of the Pike Forest Landing Zones by helicopter units from other Army bases violates the 2007 agreement between them and Fort Carson.
- The same would be true going forward.
- If the new CAB is assigned to FC there would have to be a new agreement concerning additional use of the Pike National Forest Landing Zones.
- There was an emergency landing of a FC helicopter last week in the Rampart Range area of Landing Zones.
- The Forest Service does not know if this aircraft belongs to FC or is part of a visiting unit. If it were from a visiting unit that would violate the 2007 agreement but there is no enforcement mechanism.
- The same goes for other current training. They do not know if the crews are local or from other bases

There is a reference in this testimony to LZ "Madre" and "Cattle Ranch".
This could mean there are 2 additional LZ's or different names for a known site.

The testimony says the altitude of "Cattle Ranch"is between 7,800 and 8,200, so if could be another name for "Beaver" LZ, which is in the area of between "Frosty's Park" LZ and "Almagre" LZ, but their list shows Beaver LZ at 10,800.

I don't buy for a second that Memorial Hospital would have 2 pilots show up in that condition
and NOT draw blood to type or do a tox screen.

Hours later they took blood and found 2 opiates plus alcohol in one of

the pilots' system. They mention that one of the drugs was oxycontin. The pilot said he went to his hotel and drank several beers and took the pain killers they gave him.

He says they gave him Percocet at the hospital and a presscription for Oxycontin, which he took later but they are the same thing: Oxycodone, although the Percocet has Tynenol or Aspirin also.

That does NOT explain the second "opiate" in his system:

The testimony by one pilot on page 2 of part 1 says the escape route was to the left
but it wasn't and the instructional pilot states in his testimony that he
he tried to correct to the right and that was the "escape route" but also says they were 
flying along with the ridge of Almagre to the right, so that would have been impossible.
Testimony of the pilot being trained:

Testimony of instructor pilot:

According to FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 90-95, "Any maneuver which requires the pilot to operate in a high power, low airspeed environment with a left crosswind or tailwind creates an environment where unanticipated right yaw may occur." The AC also advised of greater susceptibility for loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE) in right turns and the phenomena may occur in varying degrees in all single main rotor helicopters at airspeeds less than 30 knots.

Satellite photos of the crash area:

The Colorado National Guard has had a high altitude helicopter training facility at Gypsum, at the Eagle County airport since 1985. This reluctance to use it for this training appears to be more macho territoriality by the Army. The HAATS facility got $39 million in new funding this year.

From their website:

The Colorado Army National Guard High-Altitude ARNG Aviation Training Site (HAATS) was established in 1985 to provide "graduate level" training to military helicopter pilots flying in mountainous terrain and/or high temperatures. The HAATS training program is unique, and attracts students from around the world for 1-2 week training sessions at the HAATS facility in Eagle/Gypsum, Colorado, a small town 126 miles West of Denver, Colorado and 31 miles West of Vail, Colorado. Like the HAATS program, the HAATS facility is a unique blend of an Army Aviation Support Facility (AASF), with training and billeting functions.

The school offers a unique training methodology based on aircraft power that is designed to dramatically increase individual and crew situational awareness. Known as Power Management, the training process requires power accountability of the pilots in all flight regimes. This accountability produces insight to every situation to include multi-ship operations. The mountainous training area enhances the Power Management process and also provides the additional benefit of high altitude/rough terrain training.